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Abstract
We investigate how moral hazard problems can cause sub-optimal investment in energy efficiency, a phe-
nomenon known as the energy efficiency gap. We argue that such problems are likely to be important for
home energy retrofits, where both the seller and the buyer can take hidden actions. The retrofit contractor
may cut on the quality of installation to save costs, while the homeowner may rebound, that is, increase her
use of energy services when provided with higher energy efficiency. We first formalize the double moral haz-
ard problem described above and examine how the resulting energy efficiency gap can be reduced through
minimum quality standards or energy-savings insurance. We then calibrate the model to the U.S. home
insulation market and quantify the deadweight loss. We find that for a large range of market environments,
the welfare gains from undoing moral hazard are substantially larger than the costs of quality audits. They
are also about one order of magnitude larger than those from internalizing carbon dioxide externalities asso-
ciated with the use of natural gas for space heating. Moral hazard problems are consistent with homeowners
investing with implied discount rates in the 15-35% range. Finally, we find that minimum quality standards
outperform energy-savings insurance.
JEL: D86,Q41
Keywords: Energy efficiency gap, moral hazard, energy-savings insurance, minimum quality standard.
∗Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le De´veloppement (CIRED), Ecole des Ponts
ParisTech. Email: giraudet@centre-cired.fr.
†Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland. Email: shoude@umd.edu.
21. Introduction
The rationale for government interventions promoting energy efficiency has been debated for
more than three decades. At the heart of the debate are empirical studies finding that peo-
ple apply abnormally high discount rates to energy efficiency investment decisions (see Train
(1985) for an early review). This suggests that some investment opportunities that are pri-
vately profitable – even if energy-use externalities are not internalized – are not undertaken.
This empirical fact is known as the energy efficiency gap.
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) were the first to conceptualize this debate by emphasizing the
difference between market failure (e.g., information asymmetries, technology spill-overs, en-
ergy price distortions) and ”non-market failure” (e.g., consumer heterogeneity, hidden costs)
explanations of the energy efficiency gap. They argued that only market failures could justify
government intervention. More recently, this dichotomy has been enriched with the concept
of behavioral anomalies to account for the fact that consumers may value energy savings in a
way that is inconsistent with perfect rationality (Attari, DeKay, Davidson, and Bruin 2010;
Gillingham and Palmer 2014; Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky 2014).
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the debate by drawing attention to one market
failure, which, to our knowledge, has been overlooked in the literature: moral hazard in
the provision of quality in energy efficiency investments. For instance, the problem was not
discussed in the most recent and exhaustive literature reviews on the energy efficiency gap
(Allcott and Greenstone 2012; Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2009). We also shed light
on little-discussed policy remedies such as energy-savings insurance and minimum quality
standards for energy efficiency professionals.
Many energy efficiency technologies are considered to be credence goods, the performance
of which is never perfectly known to the buyer (Sorrell 2004). This characteristic is conducive
to a variety of information problems, which have long been suspected to be the main source
of market failures in energy efficiency markets (Howarth and Andersson 1993; Huntington,
Schipper, and Sanstad 1994). This is especially true in the building sector. Technological
complexity may cause a general lack of understanding about energy-saving opportunities.
However, evaluations of energy audits find that consumers respond less to information pro-
vision than to price signals, suggesting that the knowledge gap is small (Palmer, Walls,
Gordon, and Gerarden 2013; Frondel and Vance 2013; Murphy 2014b). Still, information
may be comprehensible but asymmetrically distributed. Several studies have examined in-
formation asymmetries in rental housing, in which the landlord is supposedly more informed
3than the tenant about the energy efficiency performance of the dwelling. They find that
a higher energy efficiency does not lead to a higher rent and that rented dwellings are less
energy efficient than owner-occupied ones (Levinson and Niemann 2004; Davis 2012; Gilling-
ham, Harding, and Rapson 2012; Burfurd, Gangadharan, and Nemes 2012; Myers 2013).
Fewer studies have examined information asymmetries in home sales, in which the seller is
supposedly more informed than the buyer about the energy efficiency performance of the
dwelling. Research conducted in the Netherlands suggests that information conveyed by
energy performance certificates tends to be capitalized into sale prices, but only weakly
(Brounen and Kok 2011; Murphy 2014a).
The information asymmetries we consider here are related, but different in nature. We
examine energy efficiency projects in which a contractor may cut on the quality of instal-
lation1 to save costs, while the buyer may rebound, i.e., increase her use of energy services
when provided with higher energy efficiency. Both actions are unobservable to the other
party. We refer to this problem as double moral hazard. Our focus is on the supply side
of energy efficiency markets; we thus extend an analysis of information asymmetries so far
confined to building sale and rental transactions.2
Our contribution is threefold. We first formalize how moral hazard in the provision of
quality leads to an energy efficiency gap. We then investigate policy tools that could be used
to address this market failure. In the building sector, firms could offer energy-savings insur-
ance (Mills 2003). However, we show that due to the unobservable homeowner’s response,
a complete insurance contract is not optimal. We also examine professional certification in
the form of minimum quality standards. We suggest that these policies be part of the policy
portfolio used to encourage energy efficiency, beside Pigouvian instruments (Allcott, Mul-
lainathan, and Taubinsky 2014), energy efficiency subsidies (Ito 2013; Boomhower and Davis
2014), energy efficiency labels (Houde 2014), building codes (Aroonruengsawat, Auffhammer,
and Sanstad 2012; Jacobsen and Kotchen 2011) and information provision (Jessoe and Rap-
son 2014). We finally quantify the size of the energy efficiency gap due to moral hazard
1Such a quality shortfall may materialize as either inefficient labor or capital input. For instance, an
insulation contractor may omit to fill wall cavities before installing insulation panels and/or install insulation
panels of a low grade.
2The hidden actions examined in our paper may propagate as hidden information in subsequent principal-
agent relationships. That is, the contractor’s failure can be internalized as the homeowner’s by prospective
homebuyers or renters, leading to non-capitalization of energy efficiency performance in home sale prices or
rental contracts. We left this fruitful question of the articulation between moral hazard and capitalization
problems for future research.
4in the U.S. insulation market, using data from the U.S. 2009 Residential Energy Consump-
tion Survey (RECS). We perform sensitivity analysis and develop a close approximation of
deadweight loss that only requires engineering data.
We find that over a large range of market environments, the deadweight losses of moral
hazard are several times larger than the costs of quality audits. They are also approximately
one order of magnitude larger than those from internalizing carbon dioxide externalities
associated with natural gas use. Moral hazard problems lead to implied discount rates in
the 15-35% range, instead of a 7% rate assumed in the absence of this market failure. Naively
extrapolating our results to the U.S. population of homeowners using natural gas for space
heating, undoing moral hazards associated with insulation could save at least 11 billion cubic
feet of natural gas and 0.6 million tons of CO2 annually, hence yielding $2.4 billion of present
value benefits. Energy-savings insurance could close 75% of this gap and minimum quality
standards could be even more welfare-improving.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 exam-
ines quality standards and energy-savings insurance as policy solutions to the moral hazard
problem. Section 4 provides numerical estimates of the energy efficiency gap due to moral
hazard in the U.S. home insulation market and comparisons of policy instruments. Section
5 discusses sensitivity analysis and a sufficient statistic approach. Section 6 concludes.
2. Energy efficiency investments and double moral hazard
Our model builds upon the double moral hazard model of Cooper and Ross (1985). Invest-
ments in energy retrofits, which typically involve hidden actions from both the homeowner
and the contractor, are considered as a canonical example. Other situations that give rise
to one-sided moral hazard can be viewed as special cases of this general model; they are
occasionally discussed in the text.
2.1. Setup
A homeowner uses energy for space heating. This energy service s, measured in indoor tem-
perature, provides her with value V (s), multiplied by a taste parameter θ > 0 representing
heterogeneity across consumers in the valuation of energy service. The homeowner expects
to pay energy bill pE0(s), where E0(·) is the energy use and p the price of energy. The en-
ergy use is a random variable influenced by idiosyncratic factors, such as weather conditions
and the architectural characteristics of the house. For simplicity, we use a deterministic
5framework; utility is quasi-linear and there is no risk aversion. The homeowner sets the
intertemporal energy service vector s0θ so as to maximize expected utility U
0(θ, s) over an
investment lifetime of l years, discounted at some rate r:
(1) U0(θ, s) ≡
l∑
t=1
[
θVt(st)− ptE
0
t (st)
]
(1 + r)−t
The homeowner can invest in retrofits to reduce her energy bill. In this setting, the
homeowner is the principal and the contractor is the agent. Energy use after investment E
is reported on homeowner’s energy bill. Hence, it is common knowledge to both parties. Yet
each one can take hidden actions s and q to influence it.
The homeowner chooses a stream of energy service s. This action is unobserved to the
contractor and a higher energy service will induce a higher expected energy use. Likewise,
the contractor provides a certain quality q in installing an energy-efficient equipment. We
assume that the quality q is unidimensional and can be measured as the number of hours
worked by the contractor. Unlike other amenities, the impact of this action on the energy
efficiency performance cannot be fully assessed by the homeowner. The only thing that is
known to both parties is that a higher quality of installation lowers expected energy use.
The homeowner considers future discounted benefits with expected utility U(θ, s, q), pays
upfront cost for the retrofit (T > 0), and receives some fixed non-energy benefits net of the
inconvenience costs generated by the investment (ǫ):
(2) U(θ, s, q) ≡
l∑
t=1
[θVt(st)− ptEt(st, q)] (1 + r)
−t − T + ǫ
In what follows, we assume time invariance of energy price, technology and consumer
value function. We remove t subscripts and consider vector s as a scalar s constant over
time. We further simplify the notations with a discount factor Γ such that:
(3) Γ ≡ Γ(r, l) ≡
l∑
t=1
(1 + r)−t =
1− (1 + r)−l
r
6Firms are homogenous in the industry. The profit of a representative contractor is the
revenue from the sale minus the cost of the quality provided:
(4) Π(q) ≡ T − C(q)
The following assumptions hold (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
Assumption 1: Technology.
(i) At constant consumer behavior s, investment reduces energy use: E(s, q) < E0(s) ∀q ≥
qmin, where qmin is the minimum input.
(ii) Contracting parties’ actions have opposite effects: E0s > 0, Es > 0 and Eq < 0
(iii) Energy savings exhibit decreasing returns: −E0ss ≤ 0, −Ess ≤ 0 and −Eqq ≤ 0
(iv) Contracting parties’ actions are substitutes: Eqs < 0 and Es < E
0
s
(v) Non-energy benefits are not sufficient to motivate investment: ǫ ≤ C(qmin)
Assumption 2: Behavior and preferences. Contracting parties are (i) value-maximizers,
(ii) risk-neutral and (iii) have twice differentiable, concave value functions: V ′(·) > 0,
V ′′(·) ≤ 0 and −C ′(·) < 0, −C ′′(·) ≤ 0
Assumption 3: Market. The industry is competitive with free entry: Π(q) = 0.
Corollary: T ≡ C(q).
Assumptions 1(i)-(v) are mild: The energy service has a convex effect on expected energy
use, and quality has diminishing returns on expected energy savings. Moreover, both factors
impede each other: The marginal increase in expected energy savings due to increased quality
is larger when the underlying energy service is high (e.g., a house heated in a cold climate)
rather than low (e.g., a house heated in a warm climate). Reciprocally, the marginal increase
in expected energy use due to increased energy service is lower when the quality installed is
high rather than low.
Assumptions 2(i)-(iii) are meant to be as standard as possible, in order to isolate the moral
hazard problem from possibly interacting with market failures and behavioral anomalies.
Their generality is discussed in Section 5.
Assumption 3 is not essential but simplifies the exposition. Whatever the structure of
the market, home energy retrofits are very specific to a bundle of home and homeowner
characteristics, and hence do not lend themselves to arbitrage. A monopolist could thus
7perfectly price discriminate. This would not change equilibrium quantities in the model, but
only the surplus repartition.
2.2. Social versus private optimum
We will consider two equilibrium outcomes: a social (hereafter cooperative) optimum c and
a private (hereafter non-cooperative) optimum nc. For any equilibrium situation j ∈ {c, nc},
the agreement between the homeowner and the contractor is a two-stage game that is solved
backward. In the first stage, the homeowner of type θ invests if the net present value
NPV j(θ) of investment is positive, given her beliefs about her future optimal energy service
sjθ and the optimal quality q
j
θ offered to her by the contractor:
(5) NPV j(θ) ≡ U(θ, sjθ, q
j
θ)− U0(θ, s
0
θ) ≥ 0
In the second stage, both agents determine their own action given their belief about the
other party’s action. We focus hereafter on this second stage, for a participating consumer
of type θ.
Under perfect information, the contract between the two parties is set cooperatively so as
to maximize joint expected surplus, subject to boundary conditions s ≥ smin and q ≥ qmin.
The optimal actions scθ and q
c
θ that solve the first-order conditions for maximization
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will be such that their marginal benefit (in terms of value to the consumer and cost savings
to the firm) equates their marginal effect on consumer’s expected energy bill:
(6) ∀t θV ′ ≤ pEs with equality if s
c
θ > smin
(7) C ′ ≥ −pEqΓ with equality if q
c
θ > qmin
The cooperative optimum (scθ, q
c
θ) can be characterized as a reaction function equilibrium.
Assuming interior solutions and applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order
conditions, we find that the reaction functions s∗θ(q) and q
∗(s) are strictly increasing:
3Throughout the paper, the objective functions are well-behaved and the first-order conditions discussed
are necessary and sufficient for maximization.
8(8) ∀t
ds∗θ
dq
=
pEqs
θV ′′ − pEss
> 0
(9)
dq∗
ds
=
−pEsq
C ′′/Γ + pEqq
> 0
Now if information is imperfect, the agreement is no longer cooperative. Both parties
maximize their private expected value, given their beliefs about the other party’s action and
subject to boundary conditions s ≥ smin and q ≥ qmin. While this yields the same reaction
function as in the cooperative agreement s∗θ(q) for the consumer, this does not hold for the
contractor. He does not internalize the expected benefits that his action delivers to the
homeowner and simply chooses the level of quality qnc that minimizes his cost:
(10) ∀s qnc(s) = argmin
q≥qmin
C(q) = qmin
Proposition 1. For a participating consumer of given type θ:
(i) the private, non-cooperative equilibrium (sncθ , q
nc
θ ) exists and is unique
(ii) the social, cooperative equilibrium (scθ, q
c
θ) exists and is unique if and only if:
(11)
dq
ds∗θ
>
dq∗
ds
proof: (i) The private equilibrium is uniquely defined as (s∗θ(qmin), qmin). (ii) Likewise,
if for at least one agent his or her optimal cooperative action is a corner solution, then
the social equilibrium is uniquely defined. If optimal actions are interior for both agents,
condition (11) implies that the composite function s∗θ(q
∗(s)) defined for all s ≥ smin is a
contraction mapping. Hence, by the Banach fixed-point theorem, it admits a unique fixed
point.
The following proposition states that the two equilibria will involve unambiguous loca-
tions:
9Proposition 2. Assuming condition (11) holds, a participating consumer of given type θ:
(i) is offered a higher level of quality at the social optimum: qcθ ≥ q
nc
θ
(ii) sets her energy service at a higher level at the social optimum: scθ ≥ s
nc
θ > s
0
θ
(iii) faces a higher net present value at the social optimum: NPV c(θ) ≥ NPV nc(θ)
proof: (i) For a given θ, qcθ ≥ qmin = q
nc
θ . (ii) Since s
∗
θ(·) is increasing, s
c
θ = s
∗
θ(q
c
θ) ≥
s∗θ(q
nc
θ ) = s
nc
θ . For all s, E
0
s > Es implies Us > U
0
s . Therefore, assuming interior solutions:
U0s |s0θ = 0 = Us|s
nc
θ
> U0s |sncθ . Since U
0 is concave in s, U0s is decreasing in s and s
nc
θ >
s0θ. (iii) Comparing net present values NPV
c(·) and NPV nc(·) is equivalent to comparing
the expected utility functions after investment U(θ, scθ, q
c
θ) and U(θ, s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ). Under the
assumption of perfect competition, the expected utility after investment is equivalent to the
joint expected surplus. Therefore, the net present value of investment is maximized in the
social outcome: NPV c(θ) ≥ NPV nc(θ).
Recall from Assumption 1(ii) that q and s have an opposite effect on E(s, q). Hence, if both
inputs increase simultaneously, as is the case when the parties move from the private optimum
to the social optimum, the decrease in energy use due to the increase in quality is partly
offset by the increase in energy service. This phenomenon is known as the rebound effect.
To the extreme, it can backfire, i.e., be such that energy use increases after energy efficiency
investments. This case cannot be ruled out from our analysis, as E(scθ, q
c
θ), E(s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ) and
E(s0θ) cannot be compared unambiguously.
We shall now make a distinction between two types of backfire rebound effect, which will
prove useful later in the analysis.
Definition 1: Genuine backfire rebound effect. A genuine backfire rebound effect
occurs if energy use after investment is larger than before investment: s > s0 and E(s, q) >
E0(s0)
Definition 2: Relative backfire rebound effect. A relative backfire rebound effect
occurs between two investment options H and L if energy use after investment is larger in
the more energy efficient option H: qH > qL, sH > sL and E(sH , qH) > E(sL, qL)
2.3. Consumer heterogeneity and aggregate welfare
We now turn to a continuum of consumers of mass 1. Consumers are assumed to all live
in a similar dwelling and only differ with respect to their preference for energy service θ.
The higher the value of θ, the higher the demand for energy service, hence the higher the
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quality offered by a cooperative firm; in contrast, the quality offered by a non-cooperative
firm remains at minimum. This proposition is demonstrated in Appendix A.
For any equilibrium situation j ∈ {c, nc}, we have, by the Envelope Theorem:
(12)
dNPV j
dθ
=
[
V (sjθ)− V (s
0
θ)
]
Γ
As V (·) is increasing and ∀θ sjθ > s
0
θ, Equation 12 means that the net present value
of investment strictly increases with θ. Hence, if there exists a cutoff type θj0 such that
NPV j(θj0) = 0, it is unique. In what follows, we are interested in this most relevant case;
alternative cases are discussed in Appendix B. Assuming that F (·) is the cumulative distri-
bution function of θ, participation to investment N j is given by:
(13) N j ≡ 1− F (θj0)
Finally, aggregate social welfare is the sum of utility before investment for those consumers
who do not invest (θ ∈ [0, θ0)), plus the utility after investment for those who do invest
(θ ≥ θ0):
(14) W j ≡
∫ θj0
0
U0(θ, s0θ)dF (θ) +
∫ +∞
θ
j
0
U(θ, sjθ, q
j
θ)dF (θ)
Proposition 3. Assuming that condition (11) is satisfied for all consumers with θ > 0:
(i) the social optimum entails higher participation than the private optimum: N c ≥ Nnc
(ii) the social optimum entails higher aggregate welfare than the private optimum: W c ≥ W nc
proof: (i) Assume θc0 (respectively θ
nc
0 ) is the cutoff value of θ in the social (respec-
tively private) optimum. Proposition (2iii) imposes the following inequality: NPV c(θc0) =
0 = NPV nc(θnc0 ) ≤ NPV
c(θnc0 ). Since NPV
j(·) is increasing, θc0 ≤ θ
nc
0 . Hence, N
c −Nnc =∫ θnc0
θc0
dF (θ) ≥ 0. (ii)W c−W nc =
∫ θnc0
θc0
NPV c(θ)dF (θ)+
∫+∞
θnc0
[U(θ, scθ, q
c
θ)−U(θ, s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ )]dF (θ) ≥
0.
This is a very general formalization of the energy efficiency gap: In the presence of moral
hazard, investments in energy efficiency entail too low a quality of installation and too
few homeowners participate. This result holds under very general assumptions of perfect
11
rationality and risk-neutrality. Concretely, the homeowner does not have the technical skills
to judge whether the retrofit has been properly completed, although she is aware that any
defects will deter the energy performance of the investment. Anticipating that the contractor
is aware of her limitations, she will expect him to save on installation costs and perform the
job poorly. Any claim that he will provide the highest quality, enabling her to maximize
energy savings, will be considered ”cheap talk” by the homeowner. The contractor will not
deviate from these expectations and indeed complete the lowest possible quality job. Quality
will be non-contractible and thus underprovided.
Appendix C discusses some comparative statics with respect to a composite indicator
of all market and behavioral features: ζ ≡ pΓ(r, l). This indicator is very similar to the
investment inefficiency parameter proposed by Allcott and Greenstone (2012). Any value of
p, r or l that does not reflect perfect competition, perfect rationality or perfect information
translates into a biased ζ. Comparative statics of ζ thus provides insight into the interaction
between moral hazard and other market failures or behavioral anomalies.
3. Policies
In this section, we examine some regulatory and incentive-based instruments that can be
used to address moral hazard in energy efficiency markets.
3.1. Energy-savings insurance
Insurance is the most common way of addressing moral hazard problems. Energy-savings
insurance or energy performance contracts typically have the contractor pay the consumer
any shortfall in energy savings below a pre-agreed baseline. In our simple framework with
no risk-aversion, insurance can be represented by a contract where the contractor bears a
share k of the energy bill:
(15) U(θ, s, q) ≡ [θV (s)− (1− k)pE(s, q)] Γ− I + ǫ
(16) Π(q) ≡ I − C(q)− kpE(s, q)Γ
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According to Assumption 3, the payment to the contractor is I = C(q) + k pE(s, q)Γ,
where kpE(s, q)Γ is the actuarially fair insurance premium.
A new, opposite principal-agent relationship superposes to the previous one: Since the
contractor now provides insurance, he is a principal and the homeowner is an agent. The
implementation of this contract can be solved backward as a three-stage game played by the
parties. In the third stage, each party determines non-cooperatively his or her own effort,
given insurance coverage k and his or her belief about the other party’s action. First-order
conditions for maximization are:
(17) ∀t θV ′ ≤ (1− k)pEs with equality if s
i
θ(k) > smin
(18) C ′ ≥ −kpEqΓ with equality if q
i
θ(k) > qmin
The optimal consumer’s response is bounded above by a satiation value smax.
4 By the
Implicit Function Theorem, the insurance reaction functions s∗∗θ (q, k) and q
∗∗(s, k) are both
increasing in k:
(19) ∀t
ds∗∗θ
dk
=
−pEs
θV ′′ − (1− k)pEss
> 0
(20)
dq∗∗
dk
=
−pEq
C ′′/Γ + kpEqq
> 0
The implementation of such a contract partly solves the moral hazard, as it induces the
contractor to offer some quality (Equation 18). At the same time, however, it gives rise to
a second moral hazard: By lowering the homeowner’s marginal value of energy service, it
induces her to consume more energy. The energy service in Equation 17 is consumed to
the socially optimal level defined by Equation 6 when the consumer is not insured (k = 0),
whereas the quality in Equation 10 is offered to the socially optimal level defined by Equation
7 when the firm offers full insurance (k = 1). Since k cannot be simultaneously equal to
0 and 1, insurance cannot achieve the social optimum. At best, both parties will agree
4Satiation is needed in the model to handle full insurance (k = 1), which brings the marginal value of
energy service in Equation 17 to zero. It could be introduced as the argument of the maximum of a parabolic
utility function. Alternatively, in our model, satiation is introduced as an upper bound on the value of s.
This specification allows for more flexibility in the numerical section, without loss of generality.
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on an incomplete insurance contract k ∈ (0, 1). We recover here the result established by
Cooper and Ross (1985). For any insurance k, the agreement (siθ(k), q
i
θ(k)) will be a Nash
equilibrium determined by the intersection of each party’s reaction function s∗∗θ (q, k) and
q∗∗(s, k). These inputs will be higher than in the private optimum; however, their location
relative to the social optimum is ambiguous.
Note that if consumer’s types are imperfectly observable to the contractor, a screening
issue arises. Consumers with the highest use of energy service may self-select into the
insurance contract that offers the highest energy savings coverage. Assuming this away, the
optimal value kˆθ that sustains the Nash equilibrium to each type is determined cooperatively
in the second stage of the game, so as to maximize joint expected surplus:
(21) ∀θ kˆθ = argmax
k∈[0,1]
[U(θ, siθ(k), q
i
θ(k)) + Π(q
i
θ(k))]
The first-order conditions for maximization in the second stage can be found in Appendix
D. Lastly, in the first stage, the homeowner chooses whether or not to invest, depending on
her net present value for the investment and given her beliefs about the contractor’s action
and the optimal insurance coverage.
Note that if the consumer were not optimizing her energy service and consuming a constant
level of it (e.g., a tenant who does not pay for her energy bill, or an employee in a commercial
building), then the second moral hazard would not occur. The optimal insurance contract
would feature full coverage and bring the parties to the social optimum.
3.2. Minimum quality standard
In our framework, a minimum quality standard translates into a perfectly enforced minimum
labour requirement q¯.5 Yet such an instrument may cause two classic types of deadweight
loss. First, compliance with the standard still needs to be monitored, which generates costs
M(q¯). These costs do not occur with an energy-savings insurance. Second, minimum quality
standards abstract from consumer heterogeneity. A minimum standard q¯ can only be the
optimal level of quality to one homeowner type, but it is suboptimal to all others (since,
according to Proposition 1, the optimal quality is unique to each type θ). As a result, a
uniform standard is strictly suboptimal over the population.
The optimal minimum standard will be set at a value q¯ that maximizes the collective
surplus, subject to the participation constraint:
5In practice, minimum quality standards could target materials used in retrofits and specific tasks.
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(22)
Maximize
q¯
[∫ θ0
0
U0(θ, s0θ)dF (θ) +
∫ +∞
θ0
[U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)−M(q¯)] dF (θ)
]
subject to NPV (θ0, s
∗
θ0
(q¯), q¯)−M(q¯) ≥ 0
As developed in Appendix E, the first-order condition for maximization will be:
(23)
∫ +∞
θ0
[
∂U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)
∂q¯
−M ′
]
dF (θ) = 0
In words, the optimal standard will equalize the sum of marginal disutilities (net of
marginal monitoring costs) of participants for whom the standard is too tight with the sum
of marginal utilities (net of marginal monitoring costs) of participants who would have been
willing to invest beyond the standard.
3.3. Intervention rules with interacting energy market failures
As we have just seen, addressing moral hazard problems through energy-savings insurance
or quality standards can improve social welfare. Both instruments are, however, second-
best. Uniform quality standards cannot eliminate the gap, because of the heterogeneity in
consumers’ valuation of energy services. Energy-savings insurance is incomplete because
moral hazard is bilateral.
Yet public intervention to address moral hazard problems may not be systematically
justified if they interact with energy market failures. Assume that every unit of energy used
generates a linear external cost px, discounted over the relevant time period with a discount
factor Γx. For instance, px is positive for environmental or energy security externalities,
and negative for average-cost energy pricing. Expected consumer utility before and after
investment is now:
(24)


U0x(θ, s) ≡ U
0(θ, s)− pxE
0(s)Γx
Ux(θ, s, q) ≡ U(θ, s, q)− pxE(s, q)Γx
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These new utility functions allow one to define new net present value NPVx and aggregate
welfare Wx functions as in Equations 5 and 14, respectively. The optimal actions that
internalize external costs are denoted by superscript x.
Proposition 4. In a world subject to both energy market failures and energy efficiency moral
hazard:
(i) When energy market failures are corrected, it is desirable to also undo moral hazard
problems: W c,xx ≥ W
nc,x
x
(ii) If no consumer is prone to a genuine backfire rebound effect, then it is desirable to correct
energy market failures. This holds whether or not moral hazard problems are addressed:
∀θ E(scθ, q
c
θ) ≤ E
0(s0θ)⇒ W
c,x
x ≥ W
c
x and E(s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ) ≤ E
0(s0θ)⇒ W
nc,x
x ≥ W
nc
x
(iii) If consumers are prone to neither a genuine nor a relative backfire rebound effect, then
it is desirable to undo moral hazard problems. This holds even if energy market failures are
not corrected: ∀θ E(scθ, q
c
θ) ≤ E(s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ) ≤ E
0(s0θ)⇒ W
c
x ≥ W
nc
x
proof: See Appendix F.
As long as energy efficiency does not backfire, correcting energy market failures is desir-
able, regardless of whether or not the contracting parties overcome the moral hazard. Indeed,
social welfare cannot be maximized if the parties do not account for the broader distortions
associated with their actions. However, the reciprocal needs not be true: If energy market
failures are not (or cannot be) corrected, then it might be desirable to maintain, rather than
undo, the moral hazard. This can actually occur if energy efficiency backfires. As a result,
energy market failures would be larger.
4. A numerical illustration: Home weatherization
The building sector is believed to have the largest and most cost-effective potential for
energy savings and carbon dioxide emissions reduction (Levine, U¨rge-Vorsatz, Blok, Geng,
Harvey, Lang, Levermore, Mongameli Mehlwana, Mirasgedis, Novikova, Rilling, and Yoshino
2007). Weatherization measures account for the bulk of this potential. According to a
widely publicized although controversial6 study by McKinsey & Co. (2009), improvements
of building shells and heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems could save 3
quadrillion end-use BTUs in the U.S. by 2020. Two-third of this amount would be achieved
in existing homes. Yet this technical potential could remain partly untapped if moral hazard
problems were to remain unaddressed.
6See Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for a constructive critique of the study.
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4.1. The sources of moral hazard in home weatherization
Home weatherization technologies involve a significant installation input. If completed poorly
by professionals, installation can be the source of many defects. This includes, for instance,
an improper connection of ducts in HVAC systems, an imperfect filling of wall cavities before
insulation installation or infiltrations around windowpanes. Detecting such defects is techni-
cally possible through a blower door test or thermographic screening. Yet these tests come
at a substantial cost to the consumer.7 Overall, there is little data available about the preva-
lence of these defects. Some analyses suggest it is sizeable on the extensive margin. As of
2008, only 15% of central air conditioning installations in existing dwellings met satisfactory
quality specifications in California (Messenger 2008). The intensive margin is particularly
ill-documented. Metcalf and Hassett (1999) find that actual returns to attic insulation are
around 10%, which is far from promises made by engineers and product manufacturers of
50%. The authors do not specifically investigate installation defects as an explanation for
this gap, but their result provides suggestive evidence that poor quality is an issue in home
weatherization.
The home energy retrofit industry is very fragmented. For instance, the HVAC industry
in California is characterized by small firms offering low wages, with a very large number
of quality problems reported (Zabin, Lester, and Halpern-Finnerty 2011). This can be
interpreted as a low quality market equilibrium, similar to what we have described through
the model as the private optimum. Moreover, Zabin, Lester, and Halpern-Finnerty (2011)
also find that barriers to entry are low and that annual turnover is as high as 25%, which
suggests that the competitive assumption made in our model is reasonable.
Various types of voluntary quality certifications exist in the marketplace, most notably
those provided by the Building Performance Institute (BPI) and the Residential Energy
Services Network (RESNET) in the U.S. These programs typically ensure that professional
workers and contracting companies are trained to the best practices and that their perfor-
mance is regularly tested. As of today, less than one percent of the professionals are certified,
which suggests that the industry self-regulation has not been successful in addressing quality
problems. In France, starting in 2014, public subsidies for home energy retrofits will be given
7Moreover, they are meant to be conducted before a retrofit, to help determine what measures should be
undertaken. They are almost never conducted after the job is completed to check the quality of installation.
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only if the job is completed by a certified contractor. This ”eco-conditionnality” rule is an
interesting way of addressing both moral hazard and other problems.8
Energy-savings insurance or energy performance contracts have been offered by energy
service companies for about twenty years in the commercial sector (Mills 2003). In contrast,
these contracts are almost absent from the residential sector.9 As we have seen through the
model, such contracts may be welfare-improving but cannot achieve full efficiency due to
the existence of a rebound effect, which typically ranges from 10 to 30% in space heating
use (Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, and Sommerville 2009). In contrast, in the commercial sector,
building occupants are expected to adopt a constant behavior, as they do not pay for the
investment nor the operating costs. The absence of moral hazard on the consumer side may
explain why contractors are more likely to provide guarantee payments in the commercial
sector.
This overview of the home retrofit industry shows that the model provides qualitative
insight into some real-world facts. We now use it to conduct a quantitative assessment of
the welfare implications of moral hazard problems. We focus on natural gas use for space
heating and investments in wall insulation in U.S. homes.
4.2. Functional forms used in the simulations
The homeowner sets temperature s, measured in Fahrenheit (◦F), above a minimum comfort
level smin. The value V (·) that she derives from this energy service is bounded above by
Vmax, which corresponds to a maximum budget dedicated to space heating. The function is
increasing and concave, and takes the following form:
(25) V (s) ≡ Vmax
(
1− e−α(s−smin)
)
with smin ≤ s ≤ smax,
where α > 0 is a calibrated parameter.
The use of natural gas E0, measured in thousand cubic feet of natural gas (MCF), increases
with indoor temperature (at an increasing rate) with a constant calibrated elasticity γ > 1:
(26) E0(s) ≡ β(s− smin)
γ with smin ≤ s ≤ smax,
8The ”other problems” justifying subsidies for energy efficiency can be either technology spillovers or
energy-use externalities. In the latter case, though, subsidies are only a second-best solution (Giraudet and
Quirion 2008).
9GreenHomes America, Inc., NJ-PA Energy Group, LLC. and EcoWatt Energy, LLC. are the few examples
we have found of companies offering energy-savings insurance in the U.S. residential sector.
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where parameter β > 0 is calibrated so as to convert Fahrenheit degrees into thousand cubic
feet.
Investment in wall insulation of efficiency G(q) lowers energy use as follows:
(27) E(s, q) ≡ (1−G(q))E0(s).
Efficiency is increasing in the quality q offered by the contractor (at a decreasing rate),
within two limits 0 < Gmin < Gmax < 1:
(28) G(q) ≡ Gmin + (Gmax −Gmin)
(
1− e−ω(q−qmin)
)
with qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax,
where ω > 0 is a calibrated parameter.
The contractor bears a fixed cost K, which corresponds to a minimum labor input qmin.
As the contractor provides the homeowner with a higher quality, he needs to have installers
work longer and mobilize higher skills, which results in higher wages. As a result, cost
increases quadratically in the number of worker.hours q:
(29) C(q) ≡ K + ρ(q − qmin) +
φ
2
(q − qmin)
2 with qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax,
where ρ > 0 and φ > 0 are calibrated parameters.
4.3. Data and calibration
Homeowners’ characteristics are drawn from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Residential
Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) of 2009. We use information on indoor temperature,
energy use, energy expenditure and income contained in the online database. We first
extract a preliminary sample of 4,306 U.S. households who own and occupy their house
and pay for natural gas for space heating. We then remove households who declare a winter
daytime temperature below 60◦F or above 80◦F and thereby obtain a working sample of
4,266 households. This sample covers 35% of the complete dataset. Summary statistics are
provided in Table 1.
In the reference scenario, we ignore potential behavioral anomalies and assume that home-
owners discount future energy expenditures at a normal rate of 7%. They do it over the
complete lifetime of an insulation project (35 years), thus assuming full capitalization of
energy savings. To keep consistency with data, we use the price of natural gas derived from
the RECS sample ($11.14/MCF), assuming away potential distortions in this market (Davis
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and Muehlegger 2010). All of these assumptions are subsequently relaxed in the sensitivity
analysis. We consider environmental damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions associated
with natural gas use and value them at $33/tCO2.
Fewer data are available to parameterize the supply side of the insulation market. We
therefore use best guesses based on the engineering literature and drawn from discussions
with practitioners. Our assumptions are detailed in Table 2.
In the RECS sample, the annual fraction of homeowners investing in insulation is 3.4%.10
Our model is calibrated so that this rate is replicated in the private optimum and can
be doubled at best. That is, participation among potential investors is set to 50% in the
private optimum. A participation of 100% in the model can thus be interpreted as an annual
insulation rate of 6.8% in the total population.
The calibration procedure leads to net non-energy benefits of $2,035. This means that
attributes such as aesthetics or acoustic comfort yield benefits that exceed the hassle factor
associated with insulation. Moreover, net non-energy benefits are necessary to induce the
median homeowner to invest in insulation. All calibration targets are outlined in Table 3
and the calibration procedure is detailed in Appendix G.
The temperature distribution found in the RECS sample is fitted with a log-normal dis-
tribution of homeowners’ types with parameters µ = 0 and σ = 1. Yet we do not intend
to reproduce such a large heterogeneity, which may be partly driven by variables omitted in
our model. Therefore, in the reference scenario, we assume a narrower distribution of home-
owners’ types with log-normal parameters µ = 0 and σ = 0.25, from the 0.5th percentile
(θ = 0.53) to the 99.5th percentile (θ = 1.90). The model fit is illustrated in Figure 1.
With these structural and numerical assumptions, the homeowner of type θ = 1 is both
the median of the distribution and the marginal participant in the private optimum. The
model satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of private
and social equilibria (Proposition 1).
4.4. Quantification of the energy efficiency gap
Simulation results are illustrated in the figures and detailed in Table 4 for the median home-
owner and Table 5 for the population average. In Figure 3, various equilibria are mapped
106.8% of the population declare having insulation installed in the last two years (variable AGEINS=1).
Note that the 3.4% rate is close to 2.9%, which would be the annual rate if investment occurred once every
35 years.
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in the framework proposed by Jaffe and Stavins11 (1994), so as to visualize the trade-offs
between economic efficiency and energy efficiency. Without internalization of energy-use ex-
ternalities, the private optimum generates modest improvements in either welfare or energy
efficiency, compared to the equilibrium before investment. In contrast, when the contractor
cooperates to undo the moral hazard, both welfare and energy efficiency improvements be-
come substantial. Average quality moves from 24 to 47 worker.hours (roughly a one workday
gap), thus moving average energy efficiency from 3% to 27%. As a consequence, the average
cost of quality increases from $2,400 to $2,830.12 Lifetime discounted welfare net of environ-
mental damages increases by $1,723 (or $1,249 if environmental damages are not accounted
for). This number is several times larger than the cost of a home energy audit, estimated
to be $347 on average (Palmer, Walls, Gordon, and Gerarden 2013). Therefore, government
intervention intended to undo the moral hazard could be welfare improving.
Further improvements along both the energy efficiency and welfare dimensions can occur
if environmental damages are internalized through a carbon price. In Jaffe and Stavins’
words, the social optimum is then moved from the ”Narrow economists’ optimum” to the
”True social optimum”. The average welfare gains from undoing the moral hazard ($1,723)
are one order of magnitude larger than those from internalizing energy-use externalities
($162). This proportion reflects the difference between the marginal inefficiency due to
moral hazard, namely the unit of energy that could have been cut by optimal investment
(valued at energy price p = $11.14/MCF), and the social cost of environmental damages
(valued at pCO2 = $33/tCO2 = $1.69/MCF). Recall that here we assume away potential
distortions in the price of natural gas, an assumption we then relax in sensitivity analysis.
The higher welfare level in the true social optimum is not general to the model, but due
to the absence of backfire rebound effects in our calibration (see Proposition 4(iii)). Indeed,
as reported in Table 4, the ”genuine” rebound effect is 31% in the private optimum and 34%
in the social optimum. In addition, we find a ”relative” rebound effect of 33%, meaning that
33% of energy efficiency gains are taken back when the economy moves from the private to
the social optimum. These numbers are in the upper range of the estimates reported by
Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, and Sommerville (2009) for space heating.
11The authors have refined their conceptual diagram over the years. The version we specifically refer to
first appeared in Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2004).
12If the supply side could perfectly price discriminate, the cost of quality would be equal to the sum of
the zero-profit price and the homeowner’s net present value. For the median homeowner, the cost of quality
would be $4,102, instead of $2,830 under perfect competition.
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The moral hazard market failure can be restated as an average implied discount rate of
20%. This value is computed by solving and averaging the discount rate corresponding to
each θ that matches the quality found in the social optimum with the net present value found
in the private optimum, discounted at 7% by assumption.
Figure 2 illustrates, with the median homeowner, how equilibria are formed through
reaction function intersections. The reaction functions are mildly upward sloping. The
consumer’s energy service varies by no more than 2 Degrees Fahrenheit with the quality of
installation. Such a sensitivity is consistent with the values found in the literature (Hirst,
White, and Goeltz 1985). While the quality offered by the contractor is always at the
minimum if he behaves non-cooperatively, it mildly increases with consumer’s energy service
if he behaves cooperatively. As predicted by Proposition 2, the social optimum implements
both a higher quality and a higher energy service than the private optimum. The figure also
pictures some comparative statics of the energy price. Pricing energy-use externalities shifts
the consumer’s reaction function inward and the contractor’s upward (c.f., Equations 35 and
36). As discussed in Appendix C, the final location of the equilibrium – at a higher quality
and a lower energy service – is not general but specific to model parameters.
4.5. Efficiency of policy instruments
To isolate the ability of minimum quality standards and energy-savings insurance to specifi-
cally address moral hazard problems, we focus here on their welfare effects gross of environ-
mental damages. Richer results can be found in Tables 4 and 5.
If homeowner types were perfectly observable, the government would implement stan-
dards corresponding to each homeowner’s optimal quality. Moreover, insuring contractors
could design optimal contracts for every homeowner (Figure 6). On average, such contracts
stipulate a coverage of 33% and close the energy efficiency gap by 77% along the welfare
dimension. As illustrated in Figure 4, insurance shifts the reaction functions toward higher
parties’ actions (c.f. Equations 19 and 20). For the median homeowner, the resulting equi-
librium entails a quality level that is intermediate between the social and private one and
an energy service that is higher than in the social optimum. Again, this positioning is con-
tingent upon our calibration, not general to the model. Under full insurance, the contractor
offers the socially optimal quality, but the marginal energy costs are zero. The homeowner
thus consumes her maximum amount of energy service (smax).
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In practice, homeowners’ types are unobservable. The insuring contractor cannot offer
each homeowner her optimal contract, just like the government cannot implement as many
standards as there are homeowner types. Rather, they both implement uniform instruments.
The optimal minimum quality standard is given by Equation 22. Let us assume first
that monitoring a standard is costless. Increasing its stringency from 24 to 47 worker.hours
increases both economic efficiency and energy efficiency (Figure 7). Further tightening in-
creases energy efficiency but not economic efficiency: The standard becomes too stringent
for most of the people. The optimal standard is very close to the quality that is optimal
to the median homeowner (47.1 worker.hours). As shown in Figure 5, such a standard is
too tight to the 5th percentile homeowner (type θ = 0.66), who would have been better-off
with a standard of 45.6 worker.hours. It is too loose to the 95th percentile homeowner (type
θ = 1.51), who would have been better-off with a standard of 48.4 hours. Therefore, there
is a narrow quality range in which the standard can be set so that average welfare is very
close to the social optimum.
A similar pattern is observed with uniform insurance. Increasing insurance coverage up to
30% increases both energy efficiency and economic efficiency (Figure 7). Between 30% and
40%, the optimal uniform insurance contract is very close to the situation where consumers
are all offered their optimal contract. Again, welfare losses due to heterogeneity are negligible.
Energy efficiency then increases at the expense of economic efficiency up to a coverage of
60%, a situation discussed by Jaffe and Stavins as a ”Technologist’s optimum”. Beyond that
point, energy efficiency starts decreasing too, until the curve hits the horizontal axis, for a
coverage of k = 100%, at the welfare level enjoyed before investment. That is, under full
insurance, the total cost paid to the contractor is so high that no homeowner can be left
with a positive net present value, hence none invests. Otherwise, indoor temperature would
be set at corner smax = 80
◦F, leading to an annual natural gas use of 79 MCF. This would
imply a prohibitive lifetime discounted energy bill of $11,442, fully borne by the contractor
and passed on to the homeowner as an insurance premium.
Overall, we find that the average welfare gain under the optimal standard is $290 greater
than the gain obtained with optimal insurance (and $720 higher if environmental damages
are accounted for). Unlike insurance, a standard entails monitoring costs, estimated for each
realization at $347 from Palmer, Walls, Gordon, and Gerarden (2013). In practice, only a
fraction of realizations can be randomly monitored, so this estimate is an upper bound of the
true monitoring cost. When accounting for monitoring costs, the welfare difference between
the standard and insurance becomes ambiguous. However, our assumption of insurance
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contracts running over 35 years certainly overestimates the welfare gains from insurance.
Therefore, the superiority of minimum quality standards over energy-savings insurance seems
to be a robust result.
5. Discussion
5.1. Sensitivity analysis
We first examine the sensitivity of the model to market barrier parameters: a larger hetero-
geneity in homeowners’ valuations, a lower initial insulation rate, higher insulation costs and
a higher absolute valuation of energy service (Table 6, Figure 8). We find that compared to
the reference scenario, absolute welfare levels vary by a large magnitude, but the deadweight
loss from moral hazard is relatively stable ($1,085-1,260). Moving from the private optimum
to the social optimum increases welfare by 3-5%. Implied discount rates amount to 17-20%.
We then introduce market failures and behavioral anomalies, the comparative statics of
which is formalized in Appendix C (Table 7, Figure 8). We model non-capitalization of
energy savings by setting investment lifetime to 10 years, the typical period of residency in a
dwelling. We also model undistorted natural gas price by removing the 49.7% markup above
marginal cost estimated by Davis and Muehlegger (2010); the price is then $5.80/MCF.
Lastly, we model undervaluation of energy savings with a 20% discount rate. Compared to
the reference scenario, introducing non-capitalization and undervaluation of energy savings
decreases the absolute welfare level and increases the implied discount rate. Removing energy
price distortions increases absolute welfare and lowers the implied discount rate. In addition,
unlike market barriers, these alternative assumptions significantly reduce the deadweight loss
from moral hazard, which amounts to $289-517 in absolute terms and 1-3% in relative terms.
If homeowners undervalue energy savings (r = 20%) and ignore environmental damages,
then they might not perceive optimal quality as beneficial: the welfare gains ($289) are
below the upper bound of the monitoring cost ($347). This does not mean, however, that
public intervention is not warranted. The situation with undistorted price of natural gas
(p = $5.80) is the closest to a market where no inefficiency other than moral hazard and
carbon dioxide emission externalities occurs. In this most relevant context, the deadweight
loss from moral hazard ($486, or $912 if environmental damages are accounted for) is still
above the monitoring cost, though by a smaller margin than in our reference scenario. This
strengthens the case for government intervention aimed at undoing the moral hazard.
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Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that the magnitude of the deadweight
loss varies considerably with the investment lifetime, the energy price and the discount rate,
but varies less with the structural parameters reflecting market barriers.
5.2. Approximating the deadweight loss from moral hazard
We seek to approximate the exact deadweight loss associated with the quality shortfall caused
by the moral hazard: ∆qW ≡ W
c −W nc. A first step is to examine the marginal welfare
change induced by a marginal change in quality, which is equivalent to solving Equation
22 with M(q¯) = 0. Envelope conditions allow us to neglect changes in participation (see
Appendix E) and, for each participant, the benefits from increased heating comfort (see
Appendix H). For a participating homeowner, the marginal benefits from a higher quality
are:
(30)
dU
dq
= −p
∂E
∂q
Γ− C ′
Integrating between qnc and qc (with qnc ≤ qc according to Proposition 2i) gives the
following proxy for ∆qW :
(31) ∆qW = −p∆qE(s
nc, q)Γ−∆qC(q)
The error associated with integrating infinitesimal changes is positive and equal to the
private benefits from increased heating comfort and the social benefits from increased par-
ticipation. Therefore, ∆qW provides a lower bound of the exact average deadweight loss:
∆qW ≤ ∆qW .
The formula is quite intuitive. It weighs the cost of quality against its benefits in terms
of gross energy savings. This corresponds to the net present value calculation typically
performed by engineers, in the sense that it only takes into account technological information.
It does not require knowledge of the utility function for energy service V (·) nor its specific
effect on energy use ∂E/∂s. Therefore, the direct rebound effect can be ignored. Still, the
formula contains the key parameters of the market and behavioral environment p, l and r
which were found to be the most important in the sensitivity analysis.
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This approximation can be used as a sufficient statistics to guide future empirical work on
the issue. Tables 6 and 7 (fourth row) show that ∆qW underestimates the exact deadweight
loss by no more than 9% in absolute value across scenarios.
We now extrapolate our reference scenario to the U.S. population. Recall that the home-
owners using natural gas for space heating covered 35% of the RECS dataset. Moreover, we
confined our attention to 3.4% of that subpopulation (hence 1.2% of the complete dataset),
the fraction of households investing in insulation annually. Applying these shares to a num-
ber of U.S. households of 115 million (U.S. Census Bureau value for 2008-2012), our analysis
covered approximately 1.4 million households. On average, the moral hazard associated
with insulation represents for each household a quality shortfall of one workday, a natural
gas overuse of 8 MCF, 0.4 tons of CO2 emissions and $1,723 of present value deadweight loss
(net of environmental damages). At the population scale, undoing moral hazard could thus
save 11 billion cubic feet of natural gas and 0.6 million tons of CO2 annually, equivalent to
$2.4 billion present value benefits.
5.3. Extensions
Considering risk-aversion would be a natural extension of the model. As a matter of fact, the
performance of energy efficiency technologies depends on volatile factors, such as weather
conditions or energy prices, to which consumers are likely to be adverse. Moreover, the
home retrofit industry is made up of small industries that have little room to diversify
risks (Lutzenhiser, 1994). In our model, risk-averse homeowners would expect higher energy
expenditures than a certainty equivalent, hence demand less energy service. Risk-averse
firms would respond with a lower quality in the social optimum. Overall, the introduction
of risk-aversion on both sides of the market would reduce the size of the energy efficiency
gap compared to a riskless situation.
Instead of assuming homogeneous firms that all fail to offer quality in equilibrium, we
could assume heterogeneous firms. Within our informational structure, a fringe of firms may
adopt reputation or signaling strategies and supply a better, or even optimal quality. Such
private forces would reduce the size of the energy efficiency gap.
6. Conclusion
We examined how moral hazard problems can generate an energy efficiency gap, and how
this information asymmetry may interact with energy market failures. Taking home energy
26
retrofits as an example, we show that if the quality of installation offered by a retrofit con-
tractor is unobserved by the homeowner, then the contractor will cut quality in equilibrium.
This leads to a suboptimal level of energy efficiency along both the intensive and exten-
sive margins: The quality offered to consumers is too low and there are too few consumers
investing.
Numerical simulations calibrated to the U.S. home insulation market suggest that the
potential welfare gains from undoing moral hazard are larger than the cost of quality audits.
This holds for a large range of market environments, most notably when moral hazard is the
only market failure in place. Therefore, undoing moral hazard is welfare-improving. The
moral hazard problem is consistent with implied discount rates in the 15-35% range. It also
induces an energy efficiency gap that is substantially larger than the one induced by energy-
use externalities. Our sensitivity analysis illustrates that the deadweight loss associated
with moral hazard can be closely approximated using only engineering data. Extrapolating
our results to the U.S. population of homeowners using natural gas for space heating, we
find that increasing the quality of each insulation installation by one workday could save 11
billion cubic feet and 0.6 million tons of CO2 each year, equivalent to $2.4 billion present
value benefits.
This insight is relatively new. While most investigations of the energy efficiency gap
have focused on the role of possible undervaluation of energy savings by consumers and
the discrepancy between ex ante engineering estimates and ex post estimates (Gillingham,
Newell, and Palmer 2009; Allcott and Greenstone 2012), ours underlines the importance of
considering the behavior of the firms supplying energy efficiency. The presence of moral
hazard offers a simple explanation for the systematic overestimation of energy savings by
engineering models.
Our analysis provides motivation for energy efficiency policies that would go beyond the
internalization of energy-use externalities. This recommendation holds as long as consumers
are not prone to a backfire rebound effect – a reasonable hypothesis (Sorrell 2009; Gilling-
ham, Kotchen, Rapson, and Wagner 2013; Borenstein 2013). When addressing the moral
hazard, the first-best outcome can only be attained to the extent that energy performance
and consumer preferences can be made perfectly observable. Since no technology can meet
that goal at an affordable cost yet, government intervention will only generate second-best
outcomes: Minimum quality standards do not address consumer heterogeneity and energy-
savings insurance raises a second moral hazard. However, our numerical results suggest that
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the former can bring social welfare very close to its optimal level. Similarly, even with modest
coverage, insurance contracts can deliver welfare gains that are economically important.
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Appendix A. Comparative statics with respect to consumer type θ
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Equation 6:
(32) ∀t
ds∗θ
dθ
=
−V ′
θV ′′ − pEss
> 0
Therefore, for any given quality q offered by the contractor, a higher valuation of energy
service shifts the consumer’s reaction function upward:
(33) ∀q, ∀θ1 > θ2 s
∗
θ1
(q) > s∗θ2(q)
As long as condition (11) is satisfied, new equilibria are determined with the properties
below:
Proposition 5. If condition (11) is satisfied for two participating consumers of types θ1 and
θ2, with θ1 > θ2, then the higher θ implies higher actions by either contracting party, in
either equilibrium:
(i) qncθ1 = q
nc
θ2
= qmin
(ii) sncθ1 ≥ s
nc
θ2
(iii) scθ1 ≥ s
c
θ2
(iv) qcθ1 ≥ q
c
θ2
.
proof: (i) is straightforward. (ii) Combined with (33), it implies: sncθ1 = s
∗
θ1
(qncθ1 ) ≥
s∗θ2(q
nc
θ2
) = sncθ2 . (iii) Likewise, (33) implies, for all s, s
∗
θ1
(q∗(s)) ≥ s∗θ2(q
∗(s)). In particular,
scθ1 = s
∗
θ1
(q∗(scθ1)) ≥ s
∗
θ2
(q∗(scθ1)). From (11), s
∗
θ2
(q∗(·)) is increasing with slope lower than 1.
Any point that is greater than its image by s∗θ2(q
∗(·)) is thus greater than the fixed point
of s∗θ2(q
∗(·)): ∀a > scθ2 , s
∗
θ2
(q∗(a)) − s∗θ2(q
∗(scθ2)) < a − s
c
θ2
⇔ s∗θ2(q
∗(a)) < a. Therefore,
scθ1 ≥ s
c
θ2
. (iv) Lastly, since g∗(·) is increasing, qcθ1 = g
∗(scθ1) ≥ g
∗(scθ2) = q
c
θ2
.
Appendix B. Participation to investment
For any equilibrium situation j, participation will depend on the limits of the net present
value function, the sign of which is indeterminate:
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(34) NPV j(θ) ≡
[
θ
(
V (sjθ)− V (s
0
θ)
)
− p
(
E(sjθ, q
j
θ)− E
0(s0θ)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Γ−T + ǫ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
The right inequality is given by Assumption 1(v). The left inequality comes from the
following inequalities: θV (s0θ) − pE
0(s0θ) ≤ θV (s
0
θ) − pE(s
0
θ, q
j
θ) ≤ θV (s
j
θ) − pE(s
j
θ, q
j
θ). The
former is due to technological assumptions about E and E0 and the latter is due to sjθ
maximizing U .
Thanks to Proposition 5, equilibrium actions sjθ and q
j
θ decrease with θ. As they are
bounded below by smin and qmin, the limit of NPV (θ) when θ tends toward zero is finite.
if lim
θ→0
NPV (θ) ≥ 0 then all consumers participate. Participation is given by N j ≡∫+∞
0 dF (θ) = 1.
If lim
θ→0
NPV (θ) < 0 and lim
θ→+∞
NPV (θ) > 0 then by Equation 12, there exists a unique
cutoff type θ0, as discussed in the text.
If lim
θ→0
NPV (θ) < 0 and lim
θ→+∞
NPV (θ) ≤ 0 then participation is nil. In this case, the
gross utility gains accruing to the homeowner never offset the increase in the payment to the
contractor.
Appendix C. Comparative statics with respect to market and be-
havioral features
Recall that ζ ≡ pΓ(r, l). A higher ζ is equivalent to a higher energy price p or a higher Γ,
that is, a lower discount rate r or a longer lifetime l.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Equations 6 and 7, we see that an increase
in ζ shifts reaction functions s∗θ(·) downward and q
∗(·) upward:
(35) ∀t
ds∗θ
dζ
=
Es
θV ′′/ζ − Ess
< 0
(36)
dq∗
dζ
=
−Eq
C ′′/ζ + Eqq
> 0
31
By the same reasoning as in Proposition 5, a higher ζ entails a higher energy service in
private equilibrium. But optimal actions cannot be compared unambiguously in the private
and social equilibria.
The influence of ζ on NPV ∗, established by the Envelope Theorem, depends on the
consumer’s reaction to higher energy efficiency:
(37)
dNPV ∗
dζ
= −
[
E(s∗θ, q
∗
θ)− E
0(s0θ)
]
As long as energy efficiency investments decrease energy use for all consumers, the net
present value is increasing in ζ. By the same type of reasoning as in Proposition 5, this
leads to a higher participation and a higher average welfare. This conclusion is reversed if
all consumers are subject to a genuine backfire rebound effect, i.e., ∀θ E(s∗θ, q
∗
θ) > E
0(s0θ).
In this case, a higher ζ decreases participation and average welfare.
Appendix D. Optimal insurance coverage
The first-order condition for finding the optimal insurance contract from Equation 21 is:
(38)
ds∗∗θ
dk
[θV ′ − pEs]−
dq∗∗
dk
[
C ′
Γ
+ pEq
]
= 0
Plugging in Equations 17 and 18 and further rearranging gives the equation that solves
the optimal coverage kˆ:
(39) ∀t kEs
ds∗∗θ
dk
+ (1− k)Eq
dq∗∗
dk
= 0
Appendix E. Optimal minimum quality standard
Assuming that the cutoff type exists and is unique, the constraint in Equation 22 is binding.
The optimization program can be solved by simply maximizing the objective function and
assuming that θ0 is an implicit function θ0(q¯) defined by the constraint. Applying the
Leibniz integral rule and the Envelope Theorem leads to the following first-order condition
for maximization:
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(40)
dθ0
dq¯
(
U0(θ0(q¯), s
0
θ)− U(θ0(q¯), s
∗
θ(q¯), q¯) +M(q¯)
)
+
∫ +∞
θ0(q¯)
[
∂U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)
∂q¯
−M ′
]
dF (θ) = 0
Recognizing that U0(θ0(q¯), s
0
θ)−U(θ0(q¯), s
∗
θ(q¯), q¯) = −NPV (θ0(q¯), s
∗
θ0
(q¯), q¯) and using the
binding constraint leads to the result (Equation 23).
Note that if participation to investment is nil without the standard, no standard will be
welfare-improving. In contrast, if participation is full without the standard, the constraint
will not be binding and the optimal standard will be defined by the following first-order
condition:
(41)
∫ +∞
0
[
∂U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)
∂q¯
−M ′
]
dF (θ) = 0
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 4
We illustrate with energy-use externalities (px > 0).
(i) For all θ, since (sc,xθ , q
c,x
θ ) maximizes Ux in the social setting, Ux(θ, s
c,x
θ , q
c,x
θ ) ≥ Ux(θ, s, q)
for all (s, q), and for (snc,xθ , q
nc,x
θ ) in particular. Likewise, we have U
0
x(θ, s
0,x
θ ) ≥ U
0
x(θ, s
0
θ). By
Proposition 3, it follows that W c,xx ≥ W
nc,x
x .
(ii) Again, for all θ, since (sc,xθ , q
c,x
θ ) maximizes Ux in the social setting, Ux(θ, s
c,x
θ , q
c,x
θ ) ≥
Ux(θ, s
c
θ, q
c
θ). In addition, we have NPVx(θ) = NPV (θ) − pxΓx[E(s, q) − E
0(s)]. Assume
θx0 is the cutoff type in an equilibrium where both energy-use externalities and moral haz-
ard are addressed, while θ0 is the cut-off type in an equilibrium where only moral hazard
problems are addressed. We have NPVx(θ
x
0) = 0 = NPV (θ0). In the absence of a gen-
uine backfire rebound effect, we thus have NPVx(θ
x
0) = 0 ≤ NPVx(θ0). Since NPV is
increasing in θ, θx0 ≤ θ0, that is, participation is higher if externalities are internalized.
The difference in aggregate welfare between the two equilibria is ∆W =
∫ θx0
0 ∆U
0
xdF (θ) +∫ θ0
θx0
[Ux(θ, s
x
θ , q
x
θ ) − U
0
x(θ, s
0)]dF (θ) +
∫+∞
θ0
∆UxdF (θ). The first and third integrands of the
right-hand side are positive (see proof (i) just above). The second integrand is also posi-
tive, since ∀θ ≥ θx0 Ux(θ, s
x
θ , q
x
θ ) ≥ U
0
x(θ, s
0x) ≥ U0x(θ, s
0). Therefore, aggregate welfare is
larger when externalities are internalized: W c,xx ≥ W
c
x . The exact same reasoning leads
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to W nc,xx ≥ W
nc
x . This is because since (s
nc,x
θ , q
nc,x
θ ) maximizes Ux in the private setting,
Ux(θ, s
nc,x
θ , q
nc,x
θ ) is greater than Ux(θ, s, q) for any other actions s and q determined in a
private setting, e.g., (sncθ , q
nc
θ ).
(iii) Assume θc0 (resp. θ
nc
c ) is the cutoff type in the social (resp. private) optimum. From
proposition (4i), we have θc0 ≤ θ
nc
0 . Therefore, the aggregate welfare difference between the
two situations is ∆Wx =
∫ θnc0
θc0
NPVx(θ, s
c
θ, q
c
θ)dF (θ)+
∫+∞
θnc0
[Ux(θ, s
c
θ, q
c
θ)−Ux(θ, s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ )]dF (θ).
In the absence of a genuine backfire rebound effect, the first term of the right-hand side is pos-
itive (see proof (ii) just above). In the absence of a relative backfire rebound effect, the second
term of the right-hand side is also positive. To see this, note that ∀θ E(scθ, q
c
θ) ≤ E(s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ )⇒
−pxΓxE(s
c
θ, q
c
θ) ≥ −pxΓxE(s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ). This, added to U(θ, s
c
θ, q
c
θ) ≥ U(θ, s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ) (which is
given by definition of the maximum) leads to Ux(θ, s
c
θ, q
c
θ) ≥ Ux(θ, s
nc
θ , q
nc
θ ). To conclude, the
aggregate welfare difference is positive: W cx ≥ W
nc
x .
Appendix G. Model calibration
Parameters α, β and γ (Section 4.2) are computed so as to allow the model to replicate
calibration targets 1, 2 and 3 (Table 3). For θ = 1 and s0 = 69◦F, this leads to:
(42)

V ′(s0)− pE0s (s
0) = 0
E0(s0) = 50
dE0(s0θ=1(p))
dp
p
E0(s0θ=1(p))
= −0.4
⇔


Vmaxαexp (−α(s
0 − smin))− pγβ(s
0 − smin)
γ−1 = 0
β(s0 − smin)
γ = 50
γ
1−γ−
Vmaxα2exp(−α(s0−smin))
pγβ(s0−smin)
2
= −0.4
⇔


α = 0.28
β = 5.32
γ = 1.02
Note that if we assume linear technology (γ = 1), then the value of Vmax that solves the
system is $2,719. This provides a lower bound for Vmax, as Vmax is increasing in γ:
(43)
dVmax
dγ
=
pβ(s0 − smin)
γ−1(1 + γln(s0 − smin))
αexp (−α(s0 − smin))
> 0
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Parameter ǫ, representing the non-energy benefits of insulation, is computed so as to allow
the model to replicate calibration target 4. As the marginal investing homeowner has type
θ = 1, ǫ is such that NPV (θ = 1, sncθ=1, q
nc
θ=1) = 0, which leads to ǫ = $2, 035.
Parameter ω is computed so as to allow the model to replicate calibration target 5:
(44) G(qmax) = .99Gmax ⇔ Gmin+(Gmax−Gmin)(1−ω(qmax−qmin) = .99Gmax ⇔ ω = .09
Parameters ρ and φ are computed so as to allow the model to replicate calibration targets
6 and 7:
(45)


C ′(qmin) = 15
C ′(qmax) = 30
⇔


ρ = 15
ρ+ φ(qmax − qmin) = 30
⇔


ρ = 15
φ = .16
Appendix H. Derivation of the sufficient statistic
For a participating homeowner, the exact deadweight loss ∆qW is:
(46) W c −W nc =
l∑
t=1
[V (sc)− V (snc)− p (E(sc, qc)− E(snc, qnc))] δt − [C(qc)− C(qnc)]
We recognize that:
(47) ∆qW = ∆qW + [V (s
c)− V (snc)− p (E(sc, qc)− E(snc, qc))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Γ
The term in brackets is positive because sc maximizes the function V (·)−E(·, qc). There-
fore, ∆qW ≤ ∆qW .
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the RECS Sample (n = 4, 266)
RECS
Unit Entry Median Mean SD Min Max
Temperature when
someone is home dur-
ing the day (winter)
◦F TEMPHOME 69.0 69.3 3.4 60.0 80.0
Natural Gas cost for
space heating, 2009
$ DOLNGSPH 562 624 386 33 3,591
Natural Gas usage for
space heating, 2009
MCF BTUNGSPH
1.023∗10−3
50.2 55.0 34.0 0.6 337.2
Price paid for natural
gas for space heating
$/MCF DOLNGSPH∗1.023
BTUNGSPH∗103
11.14 11.95 5.69 3.75 190.73
Gross household in-
come, 2009
$ MONEYPY 65,000 78,928 50,727 2,500 170,000
Income share dedi-
cated to natural gas
for space heating
DOLNGSPH
MONEYPY
0.82% 1.54% 3.20% 0.02% 65.92%
Notes: ”Natural gas cost for space heating” is measured in thousand BTU in RECS, here converted in MCF.
”Gross household income” is measured with 24 income ranges; we identify each income range with its upper
value and assume an average income of $170,000 for the top category, which is consistent with U.S. Census
Bureau 2009 data for owner-occupiers.
4
0Table 2. Model parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
Minimum indoor tem-
perature
smin 60
◦F 0.8th percentile of the RECS preliminary sample
Maximum indoor tem-
perature
smax 80
◦F 99.9th percentile of the RECS preliminary sample
Minimum labour in-
put
qmin 24 worker.hours One workday = 24 worker.hours, e.g., three installers
working 8 hours a day (Best guess)
Maximum labour in-
put
qmax 72 worker.hours Three workdays (Best guess)
Maximum valuation
of energy service
Vmax 2,816 $ The 95th percentile of the income share dedicated to
space heating in the RECS sample is 4.3%. Apply-
ing this fraction to the median income of the sample
($65,000) leads to a maximum budget for space heating
of $2,816.
Minimum energy effi-
ciency of insulation
Gmin 5% (Best guess)
Maximum energy effi-
ciency of insulation
Gmax 30% (Best guess)
Fixed cost of wall in-
sulation
K 2,400 $ (Best guess)
Physical lifetime of in-
sulation investment
l 35 years (Best guess)
Discount rate r 7% Value recommended to assess private investment (U.S.
OMB).
Price of natural gas p 11.14 $/MCF Median price of the RECS sample
Carbon price pCO2 1.69 $/MCF Equivalent to a social cost of carbon of $33/tCO2 in
2010, which is the value recommended for impact anal-
ysis in the U.S. (White House, 2013)
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Table 3. Calibration targets
Calibration target Expression Target value Source
Optimal temperature before in-
vestment to the median home-
owner
s0θ=1 69
◦F Median temperature of the RECS
sample
Optimal annual energy use before
investment to the median home-
owner
E0(s0θ=1) 50 MCF Median annual natural gas use for
space heating of the RECS sam-
ple
Price-elasticity of energy demand
before investment to the median
homeowner
See App.G -0.4 Middle value of the [-0.03;-
0.76] range found in the lit-
erature by Gillingham, Newell,
and Palmer (2009) for short-term
price-elasticities of natural gas
use
Participation to insulation invest-
ment in the private optimum
See App.G 50% See text (Section 4.3).
Expected energy savings at max-
imum quality level
G(qmax) 99%Gmax
Wage for insulation workers at
minimum quality level
C ′(qmin) $15/hour According to the U.S. Bureau of
Labour and Statistics, the median
pay for insulation workers was
$16.88/hour in 2010. According
to Zabin, Lester, and Halpern-
Finnerty (2011), the lower range
of insulation wages in California
is $10-15/hour
Wage for insulation workers at
maximum quality level
C ′(qmax) $30/hour Upper range of the values re-
ported by Zabin, Lester, and
Halpern-Finnerty (2011) for Cal-
ifornia
Notes: Parameters α, β, γ, ω, ρ, φ and ǫ (Section 4.2) are calibrated so as to allow the model to replicate these
targets. The procedure is detailed in Appendix G.
4
2Table 4. Simulation results, median homeowner (θ = 1)
Uninternalized environmental damages Internalized environmental damages
Model output Unit Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Optimal in-
surance
Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Optimal in-
surance
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ 26,342 26,342 27,613 27,327 26,151 26,160 27,470 27,521
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ 23,384 23,475 25,183 24,446 23,599 23,679 25,345 25,004
Homeowners’ equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F 69.0 69.2 70.1 71.3 67.8 68.0 68.9 70.0
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF 50.0 48.5 41.1 48.7 43.1 42.0 35.9 42.6
Annual natural gas expendi-
ture
$ 557 540 458 543 481 467 400 474
Annual CO2 emissions tCO2 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.2
Annual external cost of CO2
emissions
$ 85 82 69 82 73 71 61 72
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour 24.0 47.1 37.9 24.0 49.2 39.2
Energy efficiency of insulation 5% 27% 23% 5% 28% 24%
Rebound effect 39% 34% 89% 45% 39% 94%
Zero-profit insulation price $ 2,400 2,830 2,638 2,400 2,876 2,663
Homeowner’s net present value $ 0 1,271 985 80 1,746 1,370
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour 15.00 22.23 19.33 15.00 22.86 19.74
Insurance premium $ 2,317 2,641
Insurance optimal coverage 33% 31%
Notes: Adding ”Zero-profit price of insulation” and ”Homeowner’s net present value” gives the insulation price
that would be charged by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
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Table 5. Simulation results, averaged over the population of total mass 1
Uninternalized environmental damages Internalized environmental damages
Model output Unit Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Optimal in-
surance
Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ 27,488 27,503 28,760 28,474 27,297 27,321 28,617
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ 24,531 24,596 26,330 25,594 24,745 24,814 26,493
Homeowners’ equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F 69.0 69.2 70.1 71.3 67.8 68.0 68.9
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF 50.0 49.1 41.1 48.7 43.1 42.4 35.9
Annual natural gas expendi-
ture
$ 557 547 458 542 481 472 400
Annual CO2 emissions tCO2 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.8
Annual external cost of CO2
emissions
$ 84 83 69 82 73 72 61
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour 24.0 47.1 37.8 24.0 49.1
Energy efficiency of insulation 2.5% 27.0% 23.0% 4.7% 27.5%
Rebound effect 31% 34% 89% 63% 39%
Cutoff type of the marginal
participant
1.00 0.18 0.26 0.67 0.19
Participation rate 50% 100% 100% 94% 100%
Zero-profit insulation price $ 2,400 2,830 2,637 2,400 2,875
Homeowner’s net present value $ 29 1,272 986 86 1,747
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour 15.00 22.21 19.32 15.00 22.85
Insurance premium 2,317
Insurance optimal coverage 33%
Notes: ”Energy efficiency” is averaged over the whole population. The average over participants is obtained by
dividing ”Energy Efficiency” by ”Participation rate”. Adding ”Zero profit price of insulation” and ”Homeowner’s
net present value” gives the insulation price that would be charged by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
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Table 6. Sensitivity to market barrier parameters
Reference Large
homeowner
heterogene-
ity
Low initial
insulation
rate
High cost
of insula-
tion
High valua-
tion of en-
ergy service
σ=1 initial
rate=3.5%
FC=$3000,
C′(qmin)=$20,
C′(qmax)=$50
Vmax=$4000
Implied discount rate 20% 17% 18% 17% 20%
Exact deadweight loss $ 1,258 1,239 1,206 1,085 1,260
Proxy of deadweight loss $ 1,158 1,158 1,158 997 1,158
Appproximation -7.9% -6.5% -3.9% -8.1% -8.1%
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ Before inv. 27,488 48,901 27,488 27,488 43,100
Private 27,503 48,957 27,489 27,503 43,115
Social 28,760 50,195 28,694 28,587 44,375
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ Before inv. 24,531 45,943 24,531 24,531 40,140
Private 24,596 46,065 24,535 24,596 40,205
Social 26,330 47,776 26,264 26,129 41,940
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF Before inv. 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Private 49.1 48.9 49.9 49.1 49.2
Social 41.1 40.9 41.1 41.6 41.2
Homeowner’s equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F Before inv. 69.0 68.3 69.0 69.0 69.0
Private 69.2 68.5 69.2 69.2 69.1
Social 70.1 69.4 70.1 70.0 69.9
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour Private 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
Social 47.1 46.9 47.1 43.1 47.1
Energy efficiency of insulation Private 2.5% 2.4% 0.2% 2.5% 2.5%
Social 27.0% 25.7% 27.0% 25.7% 27.0%
Rebound effect Private 31.1% 6.7% 17.0% 31.1% 31.7%
Social 34.0% 29.1% 34.0% 34.3% 34.4%
Cutoff type of the marginal
participant
Private 1.00 1.03 1.58 1.00 1.00
Social 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.15
Participation rate Private 50.0% 48.8% 3.4% 50.0% 50.0%
Social 100.0% 95.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Zero-profit insulation price $ Private 2,400 2,400 2,400 3,000 2,400
Social 2,830 2,827 2,830 3,495 2,830
Homeowner’s net present value $ Private 29 114 14 29 29
Social 1,272 1,352 1,206 1,099 1,275
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour Private 15.00 15.00 15.00 20.00 15.00
Social 22.21 22.16 22.21 31.92 22.22
Calibrated non-energy benefits $ 2,036 2,032 1,970 2,636 2,036
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Table 7. Sensitivity to market failure and behavioral anomaly parameters
Reference Non-
capitalization
of energy
savings
Undistorted
price of
natural gas
Undervaluation
of energy
savings
l=10 years p=$5.80/MCFr=20%
Implied discount rate 20% 26% 15% 35%
Exact deadweight loss $ 1,258 517 486 289
Proxy of deadweight loss $ 1,158 473 443 263
Appproximation -7.9% -8.6% -9.0% -9.1%
Private 27,503 14,919 32,165 10,603
Social 28,760 15,436 32,652 10,892
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ Before inv. 24,531 11,954 29,196 7,640
Private 24,596 12,013 29,253 7,696
Social 26,330 12,962 30,165 8,380
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF Before inv. 50.0 50.0 50.1 50.0
Private 49.1 49.1 49.2 49.1
Social 41.1 41.8 42.0 42.5
Homeowner’s equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F Before inv. 69.0 69.0 69.0 69.0
Private 69.2 69.2 69.1 69.2
Social 70.1 70.0 69.7 69.9
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour Private 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
Social 47.1 41.3 40.9 38.0
Energy efficiency of insulation Private 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Social 27.0% 24.9% 24.7% 23.1%
Rebound effect Private 31.1% 31.1% 32.2% 31.1%
Social 34.0% 34.4% 35.0% 34.8%
Cutoff type of the marginal
participant
Private 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Social 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.28
Participation rate Private 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Social 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Zero-profit insulation price $ Private 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400
Social 2,830 2,706 2,698 2,641
Homeowner’s net present value $ Private 29 16 15 11
Social 1,272 525 494 295
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour Private 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
Social 22.21 20.39 20.28 19.38
Calibrated non-energy benefits $ 2,036 2,202 2,210 2,260
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Figure 1. Model fit to RECS sample data. The Gaussian estimator is
the normal distribution of temperature with parameters µ = 69.3 and σ =
3.4, the mean and standard deviation of the RECS sample (Table 1). The
model output is the probability distribution function of s0θ, calculated with the
triangle method and assuming a log-normal distribution of θ with parameters
µ = 0 and σ = 0.25.
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Figure 2. Reaction functions, with a homeowner of median type
θ = 1. (c) refers to the social optimum, (nc) to the private optimum and (c, x)
and (nc, x) to the same optima in the presence of a carbon price of $33/tCO2.
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Figure 3. The energy efficiency gap. The horizontal axis represents av-
erage lifetime discounted welfare, net of environmental damages valued at
$33/tCO2. The vertical axis represents average energy efficiency (with the
value 0% attributed to non-participating homeowners).
.
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Figure 4. Reaction functions under energy-savings insurance, with
a homeowner of median type θ = 1. (c) refers to the social optimum, (nc)
to the private optimum, (i(kˆ)) to the equilibrium induced by insurance with
optimal coverage kˆ and (i(1)) to the full insurance equilibrium.
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Figure 5. Reaction functions with a minimum quality standard. The
standard is optimal to the median homeowner (θ = 1), but suboptimal to all
others. For instance, it is too tight to the 5th percentile of the homeowners’
distribution (θ = 0.66) and too loose to the 95th percentile (θ = 1.51).
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Figure 6. Net present value and participation with respect to home-
owner’s type θ. The net present value (gross of environmental damages) of
investment in insulation reads on the right vertical axis. The intersection of
each curve with the zero horizontal axis determines the cutoff type θ0 of the
marginal participant in investment. For each cutoff type on the horizontal axis
(from the 0.5th to 95.5th percentile of the θ distribution), participation across
the population is determined by the value of the complementary cumulative
distribution (CCDF) of θ, which reads on the left vertical axis.
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Figure 7. Economic and energy efficiency of policy instruments. The
welfare displayed on the horizontal axis is the average lifetime discounted wel-
fare gross of environmental damages. Each mark of the uniform standard
parametric curve represents an additional worker.hour of labour requirement,
from qmin to qmax. The stringency of the standard increases counter-clockwise.
Each mark of the uniform insurance curve represents an incremental 10% of
insurance coverage, from 0 to 100%. Insurance coverage increases counter-
clockwise.
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Figure 8. Sensitivity analysis. The welfare displayed on the vertical axis
is the average lifetime discounted welfare gross of environmental damages.
Scenario assumptions are detailed in Tables 6 and 7 .
